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Introduction 
 Municipal territorial adjustments based on French socioeconomic realities have 
addressed long-standing issues. While the nearly 35,000 French municipalities guarantee real 
proximity to public action, many reforms have attempted to intervene in this political and 
administrative geography, which is considered a handicap for many small municipalities that 
do not have the means to accomplish public action. Faced with the challenge of merging 
municipalities, the state has favored intercommunal cooperation at the institutional level. 
Here, the intercommunal principle enables municipalities to work in groups to facilitate 
collaboration. The strengthening and simplification of intercommunal institutionalism 
develops both financial and functional solidarity between municipalities and their divisions. 
There were also 1,258 public administrative bodies designed for intercommunal cooperation 
(i.e., établissement public de coopération intercommunale - EPCI) with their own taxation 
powers as of January 1, 2019. At that time, there were 21 métropolises, 13 urban communities, 
223 local agglomerated communities, and 1,001 municipal communities (Bilan statistique, 
2019).
 We have thus attempted to understand the recent reform conditions for 
intercommunalities as well as the related characteristics and dynamics. This involved a 
particular focus on French metropolises. That is, the Métropole. 
 This paper aims to reflect on the extent of the impact the institutional arrangements 
have on EPCIs at the local authorities and this investigation is aimed to deduce the context of 
the above mentioned urban strategy. While this indicates some control, such as an influence 
from the French domestic situation and the EU, it points to the social background that France 
is trying to promote with the intercommunal structures. This institutional change has also 
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been implemented as part of the decentralization reform. Therefore, it demonstrates an 
overview of the development of the decentralized reform and urban policy. On the other hand, 
the characteristics of French urban politics are drawn from the movement of multiple actors 
at the local and state levels. It presents the identification of local institutional adjustment 
mechanisms to explain the implementation of French urban policies.
1. Framework on Métropole issues 
 This article deals with intercommunal structures and urban cities. We attempt to 
describe the related political and social settings, which have undergone multiple evolutions. 
Previous studies have described the second tier of local government, as it exists in a number 
of European countries. Most of these have examined countries with three subnational 
government levels. In the French case, this includes activities and issues related to the 
département. Many aspects of the reforms in the 2000s have been explained through their 
presence in local-level social policies (Négrier & Nicolas, 2011). We examine intercommunal 
institutions and urban policies in our analysis of the lower-tier local government. 
 When discussing intercommunal reform, some argue for the development of an 
intercommunal system and dynamic decentralization. Compared to the conditions of the pre-
1982 system, the centralized and hierarchical political and administrative systems no longer 
maintain powerful influences over urban cities and policies (Pinson, 2016). The intensification 
of administrative competencies and political drives has resulted in new definitions for local 
structures and state designs. Some studies have also pointed out the tendency of recentralization 
through these reforms. As noted in another analysis of the historical evolution of urban policy 
(Epstein, 2013), decentralization reforms reshape the central-local relationship. With the 
state’s evolving and changing role in that relationship, the central state has continued to 
update its influence over cities and urban policies in addition to restructuring its hierarchy 
within the frame of state management (Le Galès, 1999; Epstein, 2013; Béal & Pinson, 2014). 
In reference to these viewpoints within the central-local relationship, we also try to point to 
the perspective from which the state tends to recentralize urban policies.
2. Social and Economic Factors
 The Métropole is a new governance tool for large urban areas. Various resulting forms 
of cooperation and competency conflicts have led to new definitions for urban areas. Here, we 
examine the social and economic factors related to recent reforms.
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2.1 Local and state financial deficits
 Municipal and intercommunal assistance became increasingly important for public 
local services. There are arguments by some that the rise of institutional arrangements of 
intercommunal system places demands on economic globalization, internationalization, and 
related political strategies (Cole & Payre, 2016). We first tried to describe the reason that the 
intercommunal cooperative structure was reshaped. That is, it was based on the need to 
reduce local and state financial deficits.
 EU member states are required to follow the rules for EU fiscal discipline, which are 
designed to maintain public finance sustainability in the Eurozone. The EU imposes the 
following discipline on EU members and euro-area candidate countries: “The budget deficit 
must not exceed 3 % of the gross domestic product (GDP). Public debt must not exceed 60% of 
the GDP” (Eurostat, 2019). An intergovernmental treaty was signed in March 2012 (i.e., the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 
otherwise called the “Fiscal Compact”). The Fiscal Compact obligates signatory countries to 
adopt these measures through national legislative measures.
 Eurozone economies also fell into deep recessions along with the 2008/2009 recession. 
The Nicolas Sarkozy presidency (2007–2012) experienced a strong recession in 2009, which 
was linked to the global financial crisis of 2008. This indicated that the fiscal shock was 
particularly brutal. The François Hollande presidency (2012-2017) had dealt with a budget 
deficit while attempting to meet the 3% GDP reference value set by the EU. The executive 
branch aimed to reduce the deficit by increasing taxes and contributions. The deficit surpassed 
3% of the GDP, a requirement that had not been respected since 2007*1 . 
 The evolution of local public finance is a major issue for national government strategies 
designed to control them. The annual average rate of local expenditures had accumulated to 
more than 3.1% between 2010 and 2013, and a further witnessed a further increase by 0.3% 
between 2013 and 2017. The augmentation of local government expenditures was sharp over 
these periods (Cour des comptes, 2018). This increase was mainly due to the successive 
transfer of competencies to local authorities within the framework of decentralization. These 
measures had been carried out since the early 1980s. However, a significant portion (41%) of 
these increases did not result from decentralization, but instead resulted from a constant 
This paper is the revised version of the manuscript, prepared for presentation at the 2019 Canadian 
Political Science Association Conference.
*1 According to the statistics institute (INSEE), the public deficit fell by 0.8 points last year. It thus 
stood at 2.6% of the total GDP in 2017. This occurred in the context of strong growth (2%), meaning 
higher tax revenues (INSEE (2018) En 2017, le déficit public s'élève à 2,6 % du PIB, la dette notifiée 
à 97,0% du PIB).
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jurisdiction. The impact of decentralization was measured at 1.32 points of the GDP (Forum 
de la performance, 2018) (Figure 2.1)*2 . 
Figure 2.1  Evolution of local administration expenditures relative to GDP
     (current and constant prices between 1983 and 2016)
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Adapted from “Forum de la performance (2018)”.
 Some of the background factors involved in Act III of decentralization were related to 
French social and economic issues, including the budget deficit, reductions in local government 
spending, and efficiency strategies and when coupled with economic growth, the deficit has 
improved. While local public works spending has increased, local government debt has also 
accumulated (Figure 2.2). This confirms that local governments have increased their public 
debts, but at a slower pace.
*2 There was a profound change in the composition of local public expenditures when 
decentralization began. This meant an increase in operating expenses, particularly those related to 
staffing costs (Forum de la performance 2018).
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Figure 2.2  Annual local government expenditures (2010-2017) and local government
loans (2013 - 2017)
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Source: Cour des comptes (2018) pp. 75, 84.
 This problem has been also addressed through a comprehensive approach to reshaping 
local management systems involved in financial and administrative operations. The national 
government has actively sought to reform this fiscal system by introducing modern budgeting 
techniques. That challenge has influenced the reduction of the local government expenditure. 
As will be described later, the central government has aimed to clarify competencies to reduce 
local government expenditure overlaps. The intercommunal cooperation system has also been 
reshaped. These reforms facilitate municipalities in intercommunal cooperatives of certain 
sizes, which are dispersed across multiple institutions. These would appreciate more 
operational efficiency in the financial and administrative management duties of local 
governments.
2.2 Cross-border interurban competition
 Economic globalization imposes international competition on cities while urban policy 
strategies consist of economic development policies throughout the country. Particularly for 
urban cities, intercommunal cooperative reforms establish the structures of local economic 
development organizations (Cole, 2012). 
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 The European consequences have urged intercommunal cooperation. Urban 
development is a major issue for the economic, social, and territorial cohesion policies of the 
EU. The EU provides funding for projects and programs that cover urban and regional 
development. In particular, the European Regional Development fund aims to strengthen 
economic and social cohesion within the EU at the city level. This is done by favoring 
sustainable urban development. Several urban cities are currently undertaking urban projects 
for economic prosperity in many countries. In relation to EU funding and the need to survive 
cross-border interurban competition, French urban policy has also intentionally collected 
competencies among regions and urban cities to gain additional economic development power. 
This is designed to create an intercommunal operational organization that can effectively 
obtain EU funds. Interurban competition has thus accelerated in this context.
3. Decentralization reforms and urban policy development
 The evolution of the intercommunal system has strengthened municipal function and 
legitimacy since the 1990s. The objective was to pursue intercommunal cooperation and focus 
on shaping the territorial system to encourage development, reduction, and the creation of 
intercommunal institutions. We have thus tried to reveal different viewpoints to this 
evolutionary process. This includes those of the evolution of intercommunal cooperation and 
aspects related to the Métropole. 
3.1 The French trajectory of intercommunal cooperation under decentralization 
　　 reforms
 Despite the situational reality for local governments, the website for the Minister of 
the Interior states that France has become a deconcentrated and decentralized state. Article 
1 of the Constitution outlines that “the organization of the Republic is decentralized.” This is 
also enshrined in Article 72 regarding the notion of “free administration”.   
 A dynamic intercommunal structure has developed through the successive movements 
of decentralization (Cole, 2017). Law No. 82-213 from March 2, 1982 states that, “on the rights 
and freedoms of municipalities, departments and regions,” the so-called “decentralization” law 
(reformed by the former Minister of Interior and Decentralization, Gaston Deferre) is the first 
part of a series of legislative texts organizing a profound reform of French territorial 
organization. This is also enshrined as the status of local authorities.
 Many have pointed out that French local governments contain many layers and are 
thus fragmented (so-called “mille-feuilles”). Less than 2% of all municipalities contain more 
than 20,000 inhabitants (Table 3.1). Many small municipalities have management difficulties 
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in the absence of other subnational layers and the state (Duran & Thoenig, 1996). This also 
depends on the relationship with other local government levels and the state itself. Among the 
possible solutions, those related to size, geographical location, and population should be 
prioritized. 
 Several restorative attempts have been made regarding communal fragmentation by 
grouping municipalities to form better-armed communities that can exercise their powers. 
The law of July 16, 1971 (known as the “Marcellin law”) was inclined toward systematically 
promoting the merger of municipalities through regrouping. However, this was opposed by the 
elected officials. Municipalities thus struggled to accept the proposition. The controversial law 
left a traumatic impression among both the elected officials and administrators (Tellier, 2017). 
As early as 1976, Olivier Guichard, former Minister of Territorial Planning, reported that 
institutional territories and local government systems were incompatible with economic 
growth and social development throughout the country (Commission de développement des 
responsabilités locales, 1976).
Table 3.1  Distribution of municipalities and populations (2015)
People　 Number of 
municipalities
Percentage of 
municipalities
Percentage of 
population
 <200 8,894 25.20% 1.60%
 200 - 500 9,823 27.80% 4.80%
 500 - 2,000 11,320 32.00% 16.70%
 2,000 - 5,000 3,153 8.90% 14.60%
 5,000 - 10,000 1,173 3.30% 12.20%
 10,000 - 20,000 532 1.50% 11.00%
 20,000 - 50,000 337 1.00% 15.50%
 50,000 - 100,000 83 0.20% 8.30%
 >100,000 42 0.10% 15.20%
Adapted from“Direction générale des collectivités locales (2018). p. 8.”
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 Following its previous failure to merge municipalities, the government desperately 
switched to a technical plan of intercommunal cooperation. Municipalities have sought a form 
of relatively flexible or “associative” intercommunal cooperation to distribute public local 
services adequately at the municipal level while benefitting from the economies of scale. The 
voluntary intercommunal syndicates was the only way to maintain the fragmented municipality 
form, which had not contained their own tax systems at that time. The institutional forms 
related to intercommunal cooperation have been widely used based on the law of March 22, 
1890. Municipalities use various task-specific institutions: single-purpose intercommunal 
syndicates (syndicats à vocation unique-SIVU), pluri-purpose syndicates (syndicats à vocation 
multiple- SIVOM) and mixed syndicates (syndicat mixte). 
 On the other hand, many regional-level cities faced challenges due to rapid urbanization 
in the 1960s. New forms of EPCIs were created based on the 1966 law and equipped with their own 
tax systems, while urban communities (Communauté Urbaines) were established within regional 
metropolises in the 1960s. This also encouraged the state to balance development across the country 
while dealing with extreme population concentrations and advanced urban functions in Paris, 
consequently institutional reforms were thus carried out. 
 EPCI has developed their own tax systems to enrich their resources and authority*3 . 
Intercommunal cooperation was established by the law of 1983 (loi n° 83-636 du 13 juillet 
1983 portant modification du statut des agglomérations nouvelles), the ATR law (loi n° 92-125 
du 6 février 1992 relative à l'administration territoriale de la République), and the Chevènement 
law (loi no 99-586 du 12 juillet 1999 relative au renforcement et à la simplification de la 
coopération intercommunale), which instituted a redesign of basic local government units at 
the municipal level (Kerrouche, 2008). 
 A system of intercommunal cooperation was chosen to confront difficulties with 
communal mergers. This system has negotiated several challenges corresponding to the 
realities of local, national, and international affairs, which vary with the times. Intercommunal 
cooperation reform is adopted as an institutional solution for the phenomenon of urbanism 
(Négrier, 2005).
 The council of each EPCI, has their own tax system and they are governed by its 
council members. These individuals are the municipal councilors of each intercommunal 
cooperative authority. They are elected from among municipal council members, and have 
thus been criticized for lacking direct legitimacy (i.e., the democratic deficit) (Hoffmann-
*3 Vie-publique.fr (2018) Quelles formes prennent la coopération locale et l’intercommunalité ?
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Martinot, 2003). As such, a new voting method called “fléchage” was introduced by amendment*4 . 
This strengthened the legitimacy of intercommunal authorities. Intercommunal council 
members have also been elected by direct universal suffrage since 2014.
3.2 Continuity of intercommunal reform
 Through changes in the parliamentary majority, the decentralization reforms 
instituted during the Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande presidencies can be seen, 
partially, as a continuity of core issues. Apart from the worries over results and resources, the 
third wave of decentralization (called “Act III”) reforms allowed cities to transfer functions 
and competencies through a majority not from the state, but at the local level. 
 In the context of decentralization since the 2010s, it has not been a major objective to 
transfer administrative authority and function from the state to local governments. A new 
decentralization law was implemented during the Sarkozy presidency (the law of December 
16, 2010 for the reform of local government). It aimed to increase local government efficiency 
while reducing overlapping competencies, functions, and resources among the three 
subnational levels. It also aimed to clarify the responsibilities given to each local level. It 
stipulated that each municipality must participate in an EPCI and establish new forms of 
intercommunal cooperation. The Métropole was also aimed for urban cities in 2010*5 .
 Although this was already created by the 2010 law, Hollande’s reforms were designed 
to establish and conduct new urban policies (Caillosse, 2016). The decentralization reforms 
also promoted the reconfiguration of local government competencies with the principle of 
clarifying them and their functions. The reforms focused on rational postures, functions, and 
resources for local government systems. The leading piece of legislation was the law of January 
27, 2014, which was concerned with the modernization of territorial public action and affirmed 
métropolises (LOI n° 2014-58 du 27 janvier 2014 de modernisation de l'action publique 
territoriale et d'affirmation des Métropoles - MAPTAM). It was designed to transfer functions 
among local government levels, promote and reorganize a cooperative framework among local 
governments, and adjust complicated local finance systems. It also dealt with the affirmation 
and creation of Métropolises. As such, the law of January 16, 2015 (loi n° 2015-29 du 16 
janvier 2015 relative à la délimitation des régions, aux élections régionales et departmentales 
et modifiant le calendrier électoral) delimited the number of regions from 22 to 13, which was 
*4 “Fléchage” is a type of voting method in which the councilors of member municipalities and 
communautés are elected on the same ballot (half of the candidates receiving the most votes 
are typically sitting on the council of the member municipality and the conseil communautaire) 
(Wollmann, Hellmut 2010: 288).
*5 Vie public.fr (2011) Collectivites territoriales perspectives enjeux loi du 16 decembre 2010.
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connected to metropolitan areas. The law of August 7, 2015 was then passed to ensure the new 
territorial organization of the Republic (LOI n° 2015-991 du 7 août 2015 portant nouvelle 
organisation territoriale de la République -NOTRe). It thus outlined a principle specialization 
plan for the competencies and functions of each local government and dealt with the distribution 
and clarification of authority. EPCIs have been transformed since the adoption of territorial 
reforms in the 2010s*6 . 
 The Métropole institution was reinforced as an urban development policy during the 
Hollande presidency. At that time, laws were established to ease the requirements for 
installing the Métropole. These competencies were reinforced in multiple fields (e.g., economic 
development, housing environment, roads, and social action) based on the agreement with the 
departments in which Métropole cities were situated. They now have substantial power in 
some areas, such as social housing (Cole, 2017).
 It is essentially mandatory to comply with habitancy requirements to become a 
Métropole city (i.e., more than 400,000 inhabitants in an urban area of more than 650,000 
total inhabitants). On the other hand, it is also a voluntary process for cities with more than 
400,000 inhabitants within a capital city of the region, or in central city areas with employment 
zones of more than 400,000 inhabitants*7 . 
 Contingent on the population, multiple intercommunal structures for urban area 
systems have been established and arranged (Table 3.2). The three cities of Paris, Lyon, and 
Marseilles have functioned as designated cities in the past. The Métropole of Lyon adopted its 
new framework on January 1, 2015. It was chosen to become a territorial authority with 
special status as its own local government entity rather than an intercommunal association. 
This qualified it as a “community with special status”. It was thus equipped with both 
metropolitan and departmental competencies. The Métropoles of Grand Paris and Aix-
Marseille-Provence were later given individual administrative systems on January 1, 2016.
*6 Vie public.fr (2014) que sont metropoles creees par loi-2010. Vie public.fr (2018) Comment les lois 
de 2014 et de 2017 ont-elle réformé les Métropoles ?
*7 Vie public.fr (2018) Comment les lois de 2014 et de 2017 ont-elle réformé les Métropoles ?
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Table 3.2  Intercommunal system for urban area in 2019
EPCI (with own tax system)
Number of 
intercommunal 
groups
Number of 
grouped 
municipalities 
Métropolises (Métropoles)
  : The law of December 16, 2010 (modified by the 
law of January 27, 2014) and the law of 
February 28, 2017 (including Paris and 
Aix-Marseille- 
Provence)
21 904
Urban communities (communautés urbaines) 
: The law of December 31, 1966
13 589
Local Agglomeration Community
 (communautés d’agglomération)
: The law of July 12, 1999
223 7,488
Communities of municipalities (communautés de 
communes): The law of February 6, 1992
1,001 25,926
EPCI total 1,258 34,966
 metropolis of Lyon 1 59
Source: Collectivites-locales.gouv.fr. (2019) p. 2.
 In addition, 10 more cities were granted Métropole status on January 1, 2015: 
Bordeaux, Brest, Grenoble, Lille, Montpellier, Nantes, Rennes, Rouen, Strasbourg, and 
Toulouse were automatically transformed. Nancy joined on July 1, 2016. In addition, the law 
of February 28, 2017 regarding the status of Paris and its metropolitan planning (loi relative 
au statut de Paris et à l'aménagement métropolitain du 28 février, 2017) provided additional 
possibilities to transform the Métropole. Seven new cities were added to the Métropole on 
January 1, 2018 (i.e., Metz, Orleans, Tours-Val-de-Loire, Dijon, Clermont-Auvergne, Saint-
Etienne, and Toulon-Provence-Mediterranean)*8 . 
*8 Vie public.fr (2018) ibid.
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3.3 Institutional purposes of the Métropole under French urban policy
 These reforms were essentially designed to modify overlapping responsibilities and 
clarify community missions to avoid overlapping competencies. However, the Métropole has 
strengthened and focused on urban economic growth and development across France. The 
MAPTAM law stipulated a transfer of functions and resources related to economic development, 
urban planning, tourism, and environmental strategy from member municipalities to the 
intercommunal cooperative structure, the Métropole, communities of municipalities, and the 
agglomerated communities. The NOTRe law stipulated the mandatory transfer of municipal 
competencies related to water and sanitation to public institutions*9 . This also regarded the 
issue of urban planning. For instance, the Métropole (not the intercommunal cooperatives) 
was given duties related to upgrading transportation infrastructure in urban areas. As such, 
the Métropole aims to enhance metropolitan economic function throughout the country. 
 Some competencies were transferred on a mandatory basis, while others were based 
on agreement among concerned authorities*10. The Métropole has collected various 
competencies from the municipalities, departments, regions, and even the state*11  (Figure 
3.1).
 The national governmental attitude was evident from the very beginning of this 
discussion in 2010, based on the Ministry of Interior website, which clearly indicated the 
Métropole’s purpose as a space for transferring skills from different levels of local government 
(e.g., economic development, transportation, and education) so that the state could entrust 
them with major equipment and infrastructure*12 . Under Hollande’s administration in 2016, 
Prime Minister Manuel Valls’s website stated that the Métropolis was to delegate areas by 
convention of department, region, and state*13 .
 As previously noted, these reforms set the population size as the fundamental 
indicator for creating intercommunal cooperatives. If certain conditions were met (on a 
mandatory basis or not), they shifted toward the form of urban areas as part of the Métropole. 
It has increased the number of opportunities for these entities to integrate with the Métropole. 
*9 La gazette.fr (2019) Loi Notre : une nouvelle fenêtre pour rendre facultatif le transfert des 
compétences eau ?
*10 Liberation.fr (2015) L’EuroMétropole va devoir arracher ses nouvelles compétences au Bas-Rhin.
*11 Vie-publique.fr (2018) Quelles sont les compétences des collectivités territoriales ?
*12 Interieur.gouv.fr (2010) Qu'est-ce qu'une Métropole ?
*13 Gouvernement.fr (2017) metropolises.
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Figure 3.1  Transfer of competencies to the Métropole
Municipality Métropole Department Region
National 
government
Promoting the local ares to abroad 
Economic development
Competencies of tourisme 
Cultural and sports facilities of metropolitan interest
Coherent Territorial Planning Schemes (SCOT), Local 
urban development plan (PLU), Concerted Development 
Areas (ZAC) 
Support and assistance to higher education and 
research institutions and research programs
Construction and maintenance of public, junior, and high 
schools
Equipment for the operation of public, junior high, and 
high schools
Management of classified roads in the public domain, 
departmental road, and road services in metropolitan 
areas
Local housing programme(PLH), housing policy, tourism 
policy 
Housing solidarity fund (FSL) 
Housing policy ('bricks and mortar aid'), enforceable right 
to housing(DALO),  assistance services of housing and 
accommodation policy for disadvantaged people
Social and economic integration to prevent delinquencies
Departmental integration programme(PDI), departmental 
social action service and its service for youth facing 
difficulties
Policies for the elderly, social and family integration 
of the youth and families facing difficulties, social 
assistance for children (ASE)
Sanitation and water, cemetery, Department of Fire and 
Rescue Services (SDIS)
Facilities and infrastructures,University dormitory on demand
 Transfer within a prescribed time limit
 Transfer within the convention through discussion
Adapted from “ Liberation.fr. L’EuroMétropole va devoir arracher ses nouvelles compétences 
au Bas-Rhin”.
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 State grants have also become a contributor for the municipalities to participate in 
the Métropole. The Métropole has also raised another financial competition issue. Although 
the urban competencies in cities have been enhanced, some have criticized the insufficient 
transfer of tax revenue. On the other hand, if cities can become a part of the Métropole, it is 
prepared to finance state grants for them. It is now more concerned than ever about the 
possible side effect of cities near the Métropole losing their influence over metropolitan areas. 
Some agglomerated cities cannot become part of the Métropole, Consequently they have 
anticipated the risk of losing influence*14 .
4. Negotiating the transfer of one's authorities to others 
 The system of local government has also historically been characterized by several 
fragmentations. Each local/national linkage has established its own accommodation capacity. 
The tributary political system has resulted in significant difficulties within the center-
periphery division of political power and influence. 
4.1 Political competition
 These complexities have also produced political competition among locally and 
nationally elected officials. First, this involves the practice of accumulated elected office (i.e., 
cumul des mandate (multiple office-holding)). In 2012, there were 476 of 577 deputies (82%), 
with 267 of 348 (77%) in cumulative local executive situations*15 . The Liberation newspaper 
reported that there were 175 deputies who were also mayors in January 2017 (30% of the 
contingent), including 93 at Les Républicains (about half of their parliamentary group), while 
51 were socialists (18%) *16. This culture has produced French localism (Mabileau, 1993). 
These officials connect local interests with national political power and influence (and vice 
versa) (Hoffmann-Martinot, 2003).  
 The Senate also represents local interests. For instance, senators can accumulate 
local councilors. The state of the electoral system has resulted in most senators representing 
rural areas with thinly populated towns and departments. They mobilize political resources 
by representing small-town and rural interests. Most senators are also councilors for these 
areas; they are the defenders of municipalities and departments. 
 Second, multiple associations exist so that local executives have associations at each 
layer of the local government (e.g., Association des maires de France (AMF), Association des 
*14 Lettreducadre.fr (2017) L’excès de Métropoles tuera-t-il les Métropoles ?
*15 Vie-publique.fr (2018) Cumul des mandats : une pratique de plus en plus restreinte.
*16 Libération (2017) Cumul des mandats : c'est la fin du député-maire.
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maires ruraux de France (AMRF), Régions de France, Villes de France, and France Urbaine). 
Local executives participate in their respective associations. They represent and defend 
organizational interests at each level with national and European authority. These associations 
are committed to ensuring that the state and other local government levels guarantee their 
power. Their lobbying process is sometimes organized to result in competition (Bouvier & Le 
Lidec, 1997). 
 Third, the majority of seats at each local government layer are different. These 
differences create challenges in the adjustment procedures among local governments and the 
state (Cole & Pasquier, 2013). A laundry list of topics is sensible at both the national and local 
levels in the absence of agreement between these two parties.
 Leftist forces gained a majority of seats at the local level during the early stages of 
François Hollande’s presidency. The left wing then won an absolute majority in the 2012 
National Assembly elections. Even if the left-wing party lost seats during the municipal 
elections of 2014, they promoted reforms targeting large cities, expecting to win in large cities 
(Cole, 2014). However, the president’s socialist party and left-wing entities continued to lose 
elections at the local and national levels. The right has controlled the senate since 2014. 
Although it held a majority after the 2008 municipal elections, the left lost in the municipal 
elections of 2014. The conservative UMP Party won the departmental elections in 2015. The 
right wing has held the most important political stances at regional councils since 2015. The 
right-wing senate and left-wing assembly reached a national-level agreement during 
Hollande’s tenure, thus strengthening new large regions and the intercommunalities. Their 
compromise allowed negotiations on terms and conditions for municipalities to oppose the 
transfer of authority from municipalities to the intercommunal level.
4.2 The complexity of the decision–making process 
 The transfer of authority to other local levels is a sensitive topic. This includes 
the transfer of Departmental authority to the Métropoles, and municipal power to the 
communities of communes and the communities of agglomeration. Lobbyists for each assert 
their own rights, based on the principle of "free administration" and their proximity to local 
citizens. Local governments have not been unified. They strategize to gain authority or protest 
and remain strong within their territories. Each government has made it clear that they will 
continue to keep their own powers. 
 As defenders at the municipal level, rural mayors , who resisted a series of EPCIs 
reform delivered proposals. Until the election-reform law of 2014, there were 261 deputies 
(45%) and 166 senators (48%) in cumulative local executive situations: mayors, Presidents 
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of the Departmental Council and Presidents of the Regional Council*17 . Rural mayors were 
also included. The AMRF expressed outright displeasure the NOTRe law, which mechanically 
decreased representativeness among small municipalities. They also denounced several 
aspects of the laws passed under François Hollande’s government*18 . The rural mayors won a 
concession in some areas. Their compromise allowed negotiations on terms and conditions for 
municipalities to oppose the transfer of authority from municipalities to the intercommunal 
level. On the other hand, France Urban have also advocated for a series of reforms (Fricke, 
2019). They succeeded to collect competencies in the field of economic development from other 
local government levels *19.
 The association of rural municipalities put pressure on the government to deliberate 
over a law that would program and finance them. In 2018, the president of the AMRF contested 
this transfer; the group also warned that this transfer should not be made mandatory, 
particularly for competencies related to water and sanitation*20 . Articles 64 and 66 of Law 
No. 2015-991 of August 7, 2015 (in the NOTRe law) laid down the fundamental principles 
for the transfer of water and sanitation competencies to the communities of the communes, 
the agglomerated communities, and the Métropole. However, the government reversed this 
provision with the law of August 3, 2018. The transfer has thus been postponed until January 
1, 2026 and will be made under specific conditions*21 .
 A set of reforms has also continued to cut departmental authority. Departments 
have raised strong objections to the arguments promoting their abolishment. They still 
intend to look for opportunities to survive, especially in the field of departmental social 
action. Departmental political executives claim their advantage at the point corresponding 
to territorial solidarity and local identity. They assert that several local services should be 
retained based on performance and for equal access to community inhabitants. They wish to 
fulfill, rebalance, and redistribute public services throughout the departments not only for 
urban areas, but also for rural residents*22 . The Manuel Valls government (2014-2016) 
discussed whether the departmental system should be abolished. The ADF (Assemblée des 
*17 Vie-publique.fr (2018) Cumul des mandats : une pratique de plus en plus restreinte.
*18 Maire-info.com (2015) Manifestation de maires ruraux à Paris.
*19 Courrierdesmaires.fr (2015) France urbaine, nouvelle voix des Métropoles et grandes villes 
réunies.
*20 La gazette.fr (2018) Les maires ruraux se fâchent contre les EPCI et livrent une série de 
propositions.
*21 La gazette.fr (2019) op., cit.
*22 Departements.fr (2018) organisation territoriale - mutualisations, fusions, expérimentations… les 
départements repqrtent à l’offensive. departements.fr (2018) la fusion entre, étropoles et départements 
aggraverait les fractures sociales et territoriales
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departments de France - Assembly of French Departments) was against the territorial 
reform project, which was promoted by the socialist president. The left lost its majority in 
2014 senatorial elections, while its solidarity was weakened within the National Assembly, 
the government was forced to listen to suggestions from departmentally elected officials who 
held multiple offices*23 . The ADF later organized a symposium in Paris in 2018, where they 
emphasized their grievances about the proposed legislation that would establish a merger of 
the metropolises and departments in five major cities (i.e., Bordeaux, Lille, Nantes, Nice, 
and Toulouse). Although several departmental presidents said they were ready to merge 
their departments (e.g., Bas-Rhin (The Republicans), Haut-Rhin (Divers droite), Nantes 
(PS), and Lille (center right)) and would accommodate the project, there were also 
departments that refused to participate (e.g., Gironde (PS), Toulouse, Nice (The 
Republicans), and Bordeaux (The Republicans))*24 . 
 Depending on the regional circumstances and levels of partisanship between 
departments and urban communities, it was also difficult to reach an agreement on the 
transfer of competencies from the departments to the municipalities as well as those from the 
municipalities to intercommunal cooperatives and metropolises. On the other hand, repeated 
failures to merge departments and an intractable municipal fragmentation led the central 
government to strengthen the form of intercommunal cooperation for the future absorption of 
departments and the reduction of EPCIs for rural municipalities. In effect, some departmental 
councilors have debated about a merger of the metropolises and departments. Rural mayors 
also expressed discontent after a merger involving two-thirds of the EPCIs*25 . 
Conclusion 
 The reforms of the 2010s resulted in many issues for the central government, including 
social and economic affairs. It was required to accommodate EU requests, surmount a financial 
deficit, and win out in international economic competitions. Urban communities were thus 
strengthened and formed the infrastructure for economic development at the local level. 
 The central government promoted the creation of urban spheres to ease restrictions on 
population requirements. The issues have been rearranged to focus on one certain artificial area 
following the mandatory population requirements rather than any sphere of life. That is, the 
*23 Le monde.fr (2014) Les conseillers généraux se sentent « punis » par François Hollande.  Le 
monde.fr (2014) La fronde des présidents de conseils généraux contre le projet de réforme territoriale. 
Le monde.fr (2014) Suppression des départements, la volte-face de Manuel Valls.
*24 France Bleu Bourgogne (2019) Le transfert de compétences à la Métropole de Dijon tourne à la 
guerre politique entre deux ex-ministres.
*25 La gazette.fr (2018) op., cit.
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central government outlines the rules and priorities within the system. Local governments must 
broadly be in line with central government policies. Rules come from the national level, not the 
local (Caillosse, 2016).
 On the other hand, if the central government established these territorial reforms, it is 
assumed that local actors would have attempted to tease out a few compromises. Multiple 
mandate actors coordinate these actions. These central-local political competitions result in 
metropolitan urban policies that spur collective action and compromise based on practical 
methods. 
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